In economics and in perceptual decision-making contextual effects are well documented, where decision weights are 23 adjusted as a function of the distribution of stimuli. Yet, in reinforcement learning literature whether and how contextual 24 information pertaining to decision states is integrated in learning algorithms has received comparably little attention. Here, in 25 an attempt to fill this gap, we investigated reinforcement learning behavior and its computational substrates in a task where 26 we orthogonally manipulated both outcome valence and magnitude, resulting in systematic variations in state-values. Over 27 two experiments, model comparison indicated that subjects' behavior is best accounted for by an algorithm which includes 28 both reference point-dependence and range-adaptation -two crucial features of state-dependent valuation. In addition, we 29 found state-dependent outcome valuation to progressively emerge over time, to be favored by increasing outcome 30 information and to be correlated with explicit understanding of the task structure. Finally, our data clearly show that, while 31 being locally adaptive (for instance in negative valence and small magnitude contexts), state-dependent valuation comes at 32 the cost of seemingly irrational choices, when options are extrapolated out from their original contexts. 33 34 35 Keywords: context-dependence; reinforcement learning; value normalization; computational phenotyping 36 37 Rational and irrational consequences of state-dependence valuation human investigated this reference-dependence in RL 18-20 . These studies have notably revealed that reference-dependence 60 can significantly improve learning performances in contexts of negative valence (loss-avoidance), but at the cost of 61 generating post-learning inconsistent preferences 18, 19 . 62
Introduction 38
In everyday life, our decision-making abilities are solicited in situations that range from the most mundane (choosing how to 39 dress, what to eat, or which road to take to avoid traffic-jams) to the most consequential (deciding to get engaged, or to give 40 up on a long-lasting costly project). In other words, our actions and decisions result in outcomes which can dramatically differ 41 in terms of affective valence (positive versus negative) and intensity (small versus big magnitude). These two features of the 42 outcome value are captured by different psychological concepts -affect vs. salience -, and by different behavioral and 43 physiological manifestations (approach/avoidance vs. arousal/energization levels) 1-3 . 44 In ecological environments, where new options and actions are episodically made available to a decision-maker, both the 45 valence and magnitude associated with the newly available option and action outcomes have to be learnt from experience. 46
The reinforcement-learning (RL) theory offers simple computational solutions, where the expected value (product of valence 47 and magnitude) is learnt by trial-and-error, thanks to an updating mechanism based on prediction error correction 4,5 . RL 48 algorithms have been extensively used during the past couple of decades in the field of cognitive neuroscience, because 49 they parsimoniously account for behavioral results, neuronal activities in both human and non-human primates, and 50 psychiatric symptoms induced by neuromodulatory dysfunction [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . 51
However, this simple RL model is unsuited to be used as is in ecological contexts 11, 12 . Rather, similarly to the perceptual and 52 economic decision-making domains, growing evidence suggests that reinforcement learning behavior is sensitive to 53 contextual effects [13] [14] [15] [16] . This is particularly striking in loss-avoidance contexts, where an avoided-loss (objectively an 54 affectively neural event) can become a relative reward if the decision-maker has frequently experienced losses in the 55 considered environment. In that case, the decision-maker's knowledge about the reward distribution in the recent history or 56 at a specific location, affects her perception of the valence of outcomes. Reference-dependence, i.e., the evaluation of 57 outcomes as gains or losses relative to a temporal or spatial reference point (context), is one of the fundamental principles of 58 prospect theory and behavioral economics 17 . Yet, only recently have theoretical and experimental studies in animal and 59
Results 92
Behavioral paradigm to challenge context-dependence 93 Healthy subjects performed two variants of a probabilistic instrumental learning task with monetary rewards and losses. In 94 those two variants, participants saw at each trial a couple of abstract stimuli (options) which were probabilistically paired with 95 good or bad outcomes, and had to select the one they believed would be most beneficial for their payoff. The options were 96 always presented in fixed pairs, which defined stable choice contexts. These contexts were systematically manipulated, so 97 as to implement a 2x2 factorial design across two qualities of the option outcomes: outcome valence (reward or loss) and 98 outcome magnitude (big; 1€; or small: 10c). In all contexts, the two options were associated with different, stationary, 99 outcome probabilities (75% or 25%). The 'favorable' and 'unfavorable' options differ in their net expected value. The 100 favorable option in the reward and big magnitude context is paired with a reward of 1€ with probability 75%, while the 101 unfavorable option only 25% of the time. Likewise, the favorable option in the loss and small magnitude context is paired with 102 a loss of 10 cents with probability 25%, while the unfavorable option 75% of the time (Figure 1) . Subjects therefore had to 103 learn to choose the options associated either with highest reward probability or those associated with lowest loss probability. 104
After the last learning session, subjects performed a transfer test in which they were asked to indicate the option with the 105 highest value, in choices involving all possible binary combinations -that is, including pairs of options that had never been 106 associated during the task. Transfer test choices were not followed by feedback, to not interfere with subjects' final estimates 107 of option values. In the second variant of the experiment, an additional factor was added to the design: the feedback 108 information about the outcomes (partial or complete) was manipulated to make this variant a 2x2x2 factorial design. In the 109 partial context, participants were only provided with feedback about the option they chose, while in the complete context, 110 feedback about the outcome of the non-chosen option was also provided. 111 112
Outcome magnitude moderately affects learning performance 113
In order to characterize the learning behavior of participants in our tasks, we first simply analyzed the correct response rate 114 in the learning sessions, i.e., choices directed toward the most favorable stimulus (i.e. associated with the highest expected 115 reward or the lowest expected loss). In all contexts, this average correct response rate was higher than chance level 0.5, 116 signaling significant instrumental learning effects (T(59)=16.6, P<0.001). We also investigated the effects of our main 117 experimental manipulations (outcome valence (reward/loss), outcome magnitude (big/small) and feedback information 118 (partial/complete, Experiment 2 only)) ( Table 1) . Because there was no significant effect of the experiment (i.e., when 119 explicitly entered as factor 'Experiment': F(59)=0.96, P>0.3), we polled the two experiments to assess the effects of common 120 factors (outcome valence and magnitude). Replicating previous findings 19 , we found that the outcome valence did not affect 121 learning performance (F(59)=0.167, P>0.6), and that feedback information significantly modulated learning in Experiment 2 122 (F(39)=7.4, P<0.01). Finally, we found that the outcome magnitude manipulation, which is a novelty of the present 123 experiments, had a significant effect on learning performance (F(59)=9.09, P<0.004); Post-hoc test confirmed that across 124 both experiments subjects showed significantly higher correct choice rate in the big-magnitude compared with the small-125 magnitude contexts (T(59)>3.0, P<0.004), and similar correct choice rate in the reward compared to the losses contexts 126 (T(59)=0.41, P>0.13). 127 128
Option preferences in the transfer test cannot be explained by option expected value 129
Following the analytical strategy used in previous studies 18, 19 , we next turned to the results from the transfer test, and 130 analyzed the pattern of correct choice rates, i.e., the proportion of choices directed toward the most favorable stimulus (i.e., significantly higher than chance, thus providing evidence of significant value transfer and retrieval (T(59)>3.0, P<0.004). We 133 also analyzed how our experimental factors (outcome valence (reward/loss), outcome magnitude (big/small) and option 134 favorableness (i.e., being the symbol the most favorable of its pair during the learning sessions)) influenced the choice rate 135 per symbol. The choice rate per symbol is the average frequency with which a given symbol is chosen in the transfer test, 136 and can therefore be taken as a measure of the subjective preference for a given option. Consistent with significant value 137 transfer and retrieval, the ANOVA revealed significant effects of outcome valence (F(59)=76, P<0.001) and option 138 correctness (F(59)=203.5, P<0.001) indicating that -in average -symbols associated with favorable outcomes were 139 preferred compared to symbols associated with less favorable ones. However, and in line with what we found in simpler 140 contexts 19,28 , the analysis of the transfer test revealed that option preference did not linearly follow the objective ranking 141 based on their absolute expected value (Probability(Outcome) x Magnitude(Outcome)). For example, the favorable option of 142 the reward/small context was chosen more often than the less favorable option of the reward/big context (0.71±0.03 vs 143 0.41±0.04; T(59)=6.43, P<0.0001). Similarly, the favorable option of the loss/small magnitude context was chosen more 144 often than the less favorable option of the reward/small context (0.42±0.03 vs 0.56±0.03; T(59)=2.88, P<0.006). Crucially, 145 while the latter value inversion reflects reference-point dependence, as shown in previous studies 19,28 , the former effect is 146 new and could be a signature of a more global range-adaptation process. 147 148
Delineating the computational hypothesis 149
Although these overall choice patterns appear puzzling at first sight -since they would be classified as "irrational" from the 150 point of view of the classical economic theory based on absolute values 30 -, we previously reported that similar seemingly 151 irrational behavior and inconsistent results could be coherently generated and explained by state-dependent reinforcement-152 learning models. To hypothesize this reasoning, we next turned to computational modeling to provide a parsimonious 153 explanation of the present results. 154
To do so, we fitted the behavioral data with several variations of standard RL models (see Methods). The first model is a 155 standard Q-learning algorithm, referred to as ABSOLUTE. The second model is a modified version of the Q-learning model 156 that encodes outcomes in a state-dependent manner: 157 (1) 158
where the state value V(s) is initialized to 0, takes the value of the first non-zero (chosen or unchosen) outcome in each 159 context s, and then remains stable over subsequent trials. The first term of the question implements range adaptation 160 (divisive normalization) and the second term reference point-dependence (subtractive normalization). As a result, 161 favorable/unfavorable outcomes are encoded in a binary scale, despite their absolute scale. We refer to this model as 162 RELATIVE, while highlighting here that this model extends and generalizes the so-called "RELATIVE model" employed in a 163 previous study, since the latter only incorporated a reference-point-dependence subtractive normalization term, and not a 164 range adaptation divisive normalization term 19 . 165
The third model, referred to as HYBRID, encodes the reward as a weighted sum of an ABSOLUTE and a RELATIVE reward: 166 The fourth model, referred to as the UTILITY model, implements the economic notion of marginally decreasing subjective 171 utility 17,22 . Since our task included only two non-zero outcomes, we implemented the UTILITY model by scaling the big 172 magnitude outcomes (|1€|) with a multiplicative factor (0.1<υ<1.0). 173
174
Finally, the fifth model, referred to as the POLICY model, normalizes (range adaptation and reference point correction) 175 values at the decision step (i.e., in the softmax), where the probability of choosing 'a' over 'b' is defined by: 176
Model comparison favors the HYBRID model 179
For each model, we estimated the optimal free parameters by likelihood maximization. The Bayesian Information Criterion 180 (BIC) was then used to compare the goodness-of-fit and parsimony of the different models. We ran three different 181 
Model simulations falsify the ABSOLUTE and the RELATIVE models 195
Although model comparison unambiguously favored the HYBRID model, we next aimed to falsify the alternative models, 196 using simulations 31 . To do so, we compared the correct choice rate in the learning sessions to the model predictions of the 197 three main models (ABSOLUTE, RELATIVE and HYBRID). We generated for each model and for each trial t the probability 198 of choosing the most favorable option, given the subjects' history of choices and outcomes, using the individual best-fitting 199 sets of parameters. Concerning the learning sessions, we particularly focused on the magnitude effect (i.e., the difference in 200 performance between big and small magnitude contexts). As expected, the ABSOLUTE model exacerbates the observed 201 magnitude effect (simulations vs. data, T(59)=5.8, P<0.001). On the other side, the RELATIVE model underestimates the 202 actual effect (simulations vs. data, T(59)=3.0, P<0.004). Finally (and unsurprisingly), the HYBRID model manages to 203 accurately account for the observed magnitude effect (T(59)=0.93, P>0.35) (Figure 2 A-B) . We subsequently compared the 204 choice rate in the transfer test to the three models' predictions. Both the ABSOLUTE and the RELATIVE models failed to 205 correctly predict choice preference in the transfer test (Figure 2.C and Table S2 ). Crucially, both models failed to predict the 206 choice rate of intermediate value options. The ABSOLUTE model predicted a quite linear option preference, predicting that the transfer test choice rate should be highly determined by the expected utility of the options. On the other side, the 208 RELATIVE model's predictions of the transfer test option preferences were uniquely driven by the option context-dependent 209 favorableness. Finally, choices predicted by the HYBRID model accurately captured the observed option preferences by 210 predicting both an overall correlation between preferences and expected utility and the violation of the monotony of this 211 relation concerning intermediate value options (Figure 2.D) . To summarize, and similarly to what was observed in previous 212 studies 18, 19, 29 , choices in both the learning and transfer test could not be explained by assuming that option values are 213 encoded in an absolute manner, nor by assuming that they are encoded in a fully context-dependent manner, but are 214 consistent with a partial context dependence. In the subsequent sections we analyze the factors that affect value 215 contextualization both within and between subjects. 216 217
Relative value encoding emerges during learning 218
Overall we found that a weighted mixture of absolute and relative value encoding (the HYBRID model) better explained the 219 data compared to the "extreme" ABSOLUTE or RELATIVE models. However, this model comparison integrates over all the 220 trials, leaving open the possibility that, while on average subjects displayed no neat preference for either of the two extreme 221 models, this result may arise from averaging over different phases in which one of the models could still be preferred. To test 222 this hypothesis, we analyzed the trial-by-trial likelihood difference between the RELATIVE and the ABSOLUTE model. This 223 quantity basically measures which model better predicts the data in a given trial: if positive, the RELATIVE model better 224 explains the data, if negative, the ABSOLUTE model does. We submitted the trial-by-trial likelihood difference during a 225 learning session to a repeated measure ANOVA with 'trial' (1:80) as within-subject factor. This analysis showed a significant 226 effect of trial indicating that the evidence for the RELATIVE and the ABSOLUTE model evolves over time (F(79)=6.2, P<2e-227 16). Post-hoc tests revealed two big clusters of trials with non-zero likelihood difference: a very early cluster (10 trials from 228 the 4 th to the 14 th ) and a very late one (17 trials from the 62 th to the 78 th ). To confirm this results, we averaged across 229 likelihood difference in the first half (1:40 trials) and in the second half (41:80 trials). In the first half we found this differential 230 to be significantly negative, indicating that the ABSOLUTE model better predicted subjects' behavior (T(59)=2.1, P=0.036). In 231 contrast, in the second half we found this differential to be significantly positive, indicating that the RELATIVE model better 232 predicted subjects' behavior (T(59)=2.1, P=0.039). Furthermore, a direct comparison between the two phases also revealed 233 a significant difference (T(59)=3.9, P=0.00005) (Figure 3.A-B) . Finally, consistent with a progressively increasing likelihood 234 of the RELATIVE compared the ABSOLUTE model during the learning sessions, we found that the weight parameter (ω) of 235 the HYBRID model obtained from the transfer test (0.50±0.05) was numerically higher compared to that of the learning 236 sessions (0.44±0.05) ( Table S1 ). 237 238
Counterfactual information favors relative value learning 239
The two experiments differed in that in the second one (Experiment 2) half of the trials were complete feedback trials. In 240 complete feedback trials, subjects were presented with the outcomes of both the chosen and the forgone options. In line with 241 the observation that information concerning the forgone outcome promotes state-dependent valuation both at the behavioral 242 and neural levels 18,32 , we tested whether or not the presence of such "counterfactual" feedbacks affects the balance 243 between absolute and relative value learning. To do so, we compared the negative log-likelihood difference between the 244 RELATIVE and the ABSOLUTE model separately for the two experiments. Note that since the two models have the same 245 number of free parameters, they can be directly compared using the log-likelihood. In Experiment 2 (where 50% of the trials 246 were "complete feedback" trials) we found this differential to be significantly positive, indicating that the RELATIVE model better fits the data (T(39)=2.5, P=0.015). In contrast, in Experiment 1 (where 0% of the trials were "complete feedback" trials), 248 we found this differential to be significantly negative, indicating that the ABSOLUTE model better fits the data (T(19)=2.9, 249 P=0.001). Furthermore, a direct comparison between the two experiments also revealed a significant difference (T(58)=3.9, 250 P=0.0002) (Figure 3.C) . Accordingly, we also found the weight parameter (ω) of the HYBRID model to be significantly higher 251 in Experiment 2 compared to Experiment 1 (T(58)=2.8, P=0.007) (Figure 3.D) . Finally, consistently with reduced relative 252 value learning, we found that the correct choice difference between the 1€ and the 0.1€ contexts in Experiment 1 (mean: 253 +0.10; range: -0.24/+0.51) was 189.5% of that observed in Experiment 2 (mean: +0.05; range: -0.32/+0.40). 254 255 Explicit understanding of task structure is linked to relative value encoding 256
In our learning protocol the fact that options were presented in fixed pairs (i.e. contexts) has to be discovered by subjects, 257 because the information was not explicitly given in the instructions and the contexts were not visually cued. In between the 258 learning and the transfer phases subjects were asked whether or not they believed that options were presented in fixed pairs 259 and how many pairs there were (in the second session). Concerning the first question ("fixed pairs"), 71.7% of subjects 260 responded correctly. Concerning the second question ("pairs number"), 50.0% of subjects responded correctly and the 261 average number of pairs was 3.60±0.13, which significantly underestimated the true value (four: T(59)=3.0, P=0.0035). To 262 test whether or not the explicit knowledge of the subdivision of the learning task in discrete choice contexts was correlated 263 with the propensity to learn relative values, we calculated the correlation between the number of correct responses in the 264 debriefing (0, 1 or 2) and the weight parameter (ω) of the HYBRID model. We found a positive and significant correlation 265 (R 2 =0.11, P=0.009) (direct comparison of the weight parameter (ω) between subjects with 0 vs. 2 correct responses in the 266 debriefing: T(37)=2.8, P=0.0087) (Figure 3.E) . To confirm this result, we ran the reciprocal analysis, by splitting subjects into 267 two groups according to their weight parameter and we found that subjects with ω>0.5 had a significantly higher number of 268 correct responses in the debriefing compared to subjects with ω<0.5 (T(58)=3.0, P=0.0035) (Figure 3.F) . 269 270
Rational and irrational consequences of relative value encoding 271
Previous behavioral analyses, as well as model comparison results, showed that a mixture of relative and absolute value 272 learning (the HYBRID model) explained subjects' behavior. In particular, during the learning sessions, subjects displayed a 273 correct choice difference between the 1€ and the 0.1€ contexts smaller than that predicted by the ABSOLUTE model. During 274 the transfer test, the response pattern indicated, consistent with the RELATIVE model, "correct" options with lower expected 275 utility were often preferred to "incorrect" options with higher expected utility. To formally test the hypothesis that relative value 276 learning is positively associated with correct choice in the learning phase (i.e., rational) and negatively associated with 277 correct choice (i.e., choice of the option with the highest absolute value) in the transfer phase (i.e., irrational), we tested the 278 correlation between correct choice rates in these two phases and the weight parameter (ω), which quantifies the balance 279 between the ABSOLUTE (ω=0.0) and RELATIVE models (ω=1.0). Consistent with this idea we found a positive and 280 significant correlation between the weight parameter and the correct choice rate in the 0.1€ contexts (R 2 =0.19, P=0.0005) 281
and a negative and significant correlation between the same parameter and the correct choice rate in the transfer test 282 (R 2 =0.42, P=0.00000003) (Figure 3.G-H) . This means that, the better a subject was at picking the correct option during the 283 learning phase (rational behavior), the least often she would pick the option with the highest absolute value during the test 284 phase (irrational behavior). 285
In the present paper, we investigated state-dependent valuation in human reinforcement learning. In particular, we adapted a 288 task designed to address the reference-dependence 19 to include an additional manipulation of the magnitude of outcomes, 289 in order to investigate range-adaptation 26 . In the learning sessions, analyses of behavioral data showed that the 290 manipulation of outcome valence had a significant effect on learning performance, with high-magnitude outcomes inducing 291 better learning compared to low-magnitude outcomes. On the contrary, and in line with what we reported previously 19 , the 292 manipulation of outcome valence had no such effect. In the transfer test, participants exhibited seemingly irrational 293 preferences, sometimes preferring options that had objectively lower expected values than other options. Crucially, these 294 irrational preferences are compatible with state-dependent valuation. 295 296 State-dependent (or context-dependent) valuation has been ascribed to a large number of different behavioral, neural and 297 computational manifestations 16 . Under this rather general umbrella, reference-dependence and range-adaptation constitute 298 two specific, and in principle dissociable, mechanisms: on the one hand, reference-dependence is the mechanism through 299 which, in a context where monetary losses are frequent, loss avoidance (an affective neural event) is experienced as a 300 positive outcome. On the other hand, range-adaptation is the mechanism through which, in contexts with different outcome 301 magnitudes (i.e., different affective saliency), high-magnitude and low-magnitude outcomes are experienced similarly. 302
303
In order to formally and quantitatively test for the presence of these two components of state-dependent valuation in our 304 experimental data, we used computational modelling. Our model space included two 'extreme' models: the ABSOLUTE and 305 the RELATIVE models. The ABSOLUTE model learns the context-independent -absolute -value of available options. In 306 contrast, the RELATIVE model implements both reference-dependence and range-adaptation ('full' adaptation; 29 ). These 307 two 'extreme' models predict radically different choice patterns in both the learning sessions and the transfer test. While the 308 ABSOLUTE model predicts a big effect of outcome magnitude in the learning sessions and rational preferences in the 309 transfer test, the RELATIVE model predicts no magnitude effect and highly irrational preferences in the transfer test. 310
Specifically, according to the RELATIVE model, the choices in the transfer test are not affected by the outcome valence or by 311 the outcome magnitude, but dominated by options' context-dependent favorableness factor. Comparison between model 312 simulations and experimental data falsified both models 31 , since in both the learning sessions and in the transfer test, 313 subjects performance lied in between the predictions of the ABSOLUTE and RELATIVE models. To account for this pattern 314
we designed a HYBRID model. The HYBRID model implements a trade-off between the absolute and relative learning 315 modules, which is governed by an additional free parameter ('partial adaptation'; 29 ). Owing to this partial adaptation, the 316 HYBRID model accurately accounts for the performance in the learning sessions and for the preferences expressed in the 317 transfer test, including the preference inversion patterns. 318 319 Using model comparison, we attempted to provide a specific description of the process at stake in our task, and ruled out 320 alternative accounts of normalization. Crucially, normalization can be implemented as an adaptation over time of the 321 valuation mechanism to account for the distribution of option values encountered in successive choices, or as a time-322 independent decision mechanism limited to the values of options considered in one choice event 24,33 . In the present case, 323 model comparison favored the HYBRID model which implements a time-adapting value normalization against the POLICY 324 model which implements a time-independent decision normalization. This result derives from the fact that during the learning 325 sessions, the POLICY model uses a divisive normalization at the moment of choice to level the learning performance in values cannot produce the seemingly irrational preferences observed in the transfer test. 328
329
The idea that the magnitude of available outcomes is somewhat rescaled by decision-makers is the cornerstone of the 330 concept of utility 22 . In economics, this magnitude normalization is considered a stable property of individuals, and typically 331 modelled with a marginally decreasing utility function whose parameters reflect individual core preferences 34, 35 This 332 approach was implemented in the UTILITY model, present in our model space. However, this model did not provide a 333 satisfactory account of the behavioral data, and hence was not favored by the model-comparison approach. Similarly to the 334 case of the POLICY model, this result derives from the fact that the UTILITY model cannot account for the emergence of 335 reference-dependence, which is necessary to produce preference reversals between the symbols of opposite valence in the 336 transfer test. Crucially, correct choice rate during the learning sessions were equally well predicted by the UTILITY and the 337 HYBRID models, thus highlighting the importance of using a transfer test, where options are extrapolated from original 338 contexts, to challenge computational models of value learning and encoding 19, 36, 37 . 339 340 Overall, our model comparison (based on both goodness-of-fit criteria and simulation-based falsification) favored the 341 HYBRID model, which indicates that the pattern of choices exhibited by our subjects in the learning sessions and in the 342 transfer test is most probably the result of a trade-off between absolute and relative values. In the HYBRID model, this trade-343 off was implemented by a subject-specific weight parameter (ω), which quantified the relative influence of the normalized 344 versus absolute value-learning modules. A series of subsequent analyses revealed that several relevant factors affect this 345 trade-off. First, we showed using an original trial-by-trial model comparison that the trade-off between absolute value-346 learning and normalized value learning implemented by the HYBRID model is progressive and gradual. This is an important 347 novelty compared to previous work which only suggested such progressivity by showing that value rescaling was dependent 348 of progressively acquired feedback information (18) . Note that learning normalized value ultimately converges to learning 349 which option of a context is best, regardless of its valence or relative value compared to the alternative option. Second, and 350 in line with the idea that information concerning the forgone outcome promotes state dependent valuation 18, 32 , we also found 351 that the relative weight of the normalized-value learning module (ω) increased when more information was available 352 (counterfactual feedback). Finally, individuals whose pattern of choices was indicative of a strong influence of the normalized 353 value learning module (i.e., with higher ω) appeared to have a better understanding of the task, assessed in the debriefing. 354
Overall, these findings suggest that value normalization is the results of a 'high-level' -or 'model-based' -process through 355 which outcome information is not only used to update action values, but also to build an explicit representation of the 356 embedding context where outcomes are experienced. Consistent with this interpretation, value normalization has recently 357 been shown to be degraded by manipulations imposing a penalty for high-level costly cognitive functions, such as high 358 memory load conditions in economic decision-making tasks 38 . One can also speculate that value contextualization should be 359 impaired under high cognitive load 39 and when outcome information is made unconscious 40 . Future research using multi-360 tasking and visual masking could address these hypotheses 41 . An additional feature of the design suggests that this value 361 normalization is an active process. In our paradigm the different choice contexts were presented in an interleaved manner, 362 meaning that a subject could not be presented with the same context more than a few times in a row. Therefore, contextual 363 effects could not be ascribed to slow and passive habituation (or sensitization) processes. 364 365 Although the present results, together with converging evidence in economics and psychology, concordantly point that state-the exact implementation of such contextual influences. In paradigms where subjects are systematically presented with full 368 feedback information, it would seem that subjects simply encode the difference between obtained and forgone outcome, thus 369 parsimoniously achieving full context-dependence without explicitly representing and encoding state value 18, 32 . However, 370 such models cannot be easily and effectively adapted to tasks where only partial feedback information is available. In these 371 tasks, context-dependence has been more efficiently implemented by assuming separate representational structures for 372 action and state values which are then used to center action-specific prediction errors 19,20 . In the present paper, we 373 implemented this computational architecture in the HYBRID model, which builds on a partial adaptation scheme between an 374 ABSOLUTE and a RELATIVE model. Although descriptive by nature, such hybrid models are commonly used in multi-step 375 decision-making paradigms, e.g., to implement trade-offs between model-based and model free learning 42-44 , because they 376 allow to readily quantify the contributions of different learning strategies, and to straightforwardly map to popular dual-377 process accounts of decision-making 45, 46 . In this respect, future studies adapting the present paradigm for functional 378 imaging will be crucial to assess whether absolute and relative (i.e., reference-point centered and range adapted) outcome 379 values are encoded in different regions (dual valuation), or whether contextual information is readily integrated with outcome 380 values in a single brain region (partial adaptation). However, it should be noted that previous studies using similar paradigms, 381 consistently provided support for the second hypothesis, by showing that contextual information is integrated in a brain 382 valuation system encompassing both the ventral striatum and the ventral prefrontal cortex, which therefore represent 383 'partially adapted' values 19, 20, 29 . This is corroborated by similar observations from electrophysiological recordings of single 384 neurons in monkeys 26, 27, 47, 48 . 385
386
As in our previous study 19,28 , we also manipulated outcome valence in order to create 'gain' and 'loss' decision frames. 387
While focusing on the results related to the manipulation of outcome magnitude, which represented the novelty of the present 388 design, we nonetheless replicated previous findings indicating that subjects perform equally well in both decision frames and 389 that this effect is parsimoniously explained assuming relative value encoding. This robust result contradicts both standard 390 reinforcement principles and behavioral economic results. In the context of animal learning literature, while Thorndike's 391 famous law of effect parsimoniously predicts reward maximization in a 'gain' decision frame, it fails to explain punishment 392 minimization in the 'loss' frame. Mower elegantly formalized this issue ( 49 'how can a shock that is not experienced, i.e., 393 which is avoided, be said to provide […] a source of […] satisfaction?') and proposed the two-factor theory that can be seen 394 as an antecedent of our relative value-learning model. In addition, the gain/loss behavioral symmetry is surprising with 395 respects to behavioral economic theory because it contradicts the loss aversion principle 17 . In fact, if 'losses loom larger 396 than gains', one would predict a higher correct response rate in the 'loss' compared to the 'gain' domain in our task. Yet, 397 such deviations to standard behavioral economic theory are not infrequent when decisions are based on experience rather 398 than description 50 , an observation referred to as the "experience/description gap" 51,52 . While studies of the 399 "experience/description gap" typically focus on deviations regarding attitude risky and rare outcomes, our and other groups' 400 results indicate that a-less documented but nonetheless -robust instance of the experience/description gap is precisely the 401 absence of loss aversion 3,53 . 402
403
To conclude, state-dependent valuation, defined as the combination of reference-point dependence and range-adaptation, is 404 a double-edged sword of value-based learning and decision-making. Reference-point dependence provides obvious 405 beneficial behavioral consequences in punishment avoidance contexts and range-adaptation allows to perform optimally 406 when decreasing outcome magnitudes. The combination of these two mechanisms (implemented in the HYBRID model) is learning performance are traded-off against possible suboptimal preferences and decisions, when options are extrapolated 409 from their original context. Crucially, our results show that state-dependent valuation remains only partial. As a consequence, 410 subjects under-performed in the learning sessions relative to full context-dependent strategies (RELATIVE model), as well as 411 in the transfer test relative to absolute value strategies (ABSOLUTE model). These findings support the idea that bounded 412 rationality may not only arise from intrinsic limitations of the brain computing capacity, but also from the fact that different 413 situations require different valuation strategies to achieve optimal performance. Given the fact that humans and animals 414 often interact with changing and probabilistic environments, apparent bounded rationality may simply be the result of the 415 effort for being able to achieve a good level of performance in a variety of different contexts. These results shed new light on 416 the computational constraints shaping everyday reinforcement learning abilities in humans, most-likely set by evolutionary 417 forces to optimally forage in changing environments 36 . 418 419 420
Experimental subjects 423
We tested 60 subjects (39 females; aged 22.3±3.3 years). Subjects were recruited via Internet advertising in a local mailing-424 list dedicated to cognitive science-related activities. We experienced no technical problems, so we were able to include all 60 425 subjects. The research was carried out following the principles and guidelines for experiments including human participants 426 provided in the declaration of Helsinki (1964, revised in 2013) . The local Ethical Committee approved the study and subjects 427 provided written informed consent prior to their inclusion. To sustain motivation throughout the experiment, subjects were 428 given a bonus dependent on the actual money won in the experiment (average money won: 3.73±0.27, against chance 429 T(59)=13.9, P<0.0001). 430 431
Behavioral protocol 432
Subjects performed a probabilistic instrumental learning task adapted from previous imaging and patient studies 19 . Subjects 433 were first provided with written instructions, which were reformulated orally if necessary. They were explained that the aim of 434 the task was to maximize their payoff and that seeking monetary rewards and avoiding monetary losses were equally 435 important. For each experiment, subjects performed two learning sessions. Cues were abstract stimuli taken from the 436 Agathodaimon alphabet. Each session contained four novel pairs of cues. The pairs of cues were fixed, so that a given cue 437 was always presented with the same other cue. Thus, within sessions, pairs of cues represented stable choice contexts. 438
Within sessions, each pair of cues was presented 20 times for a total of 80 trials. The four cue pairs corresponded to the four 439 contexts (reward/big magnitude, reward/small magnitude, loss/big magnitude and loss/small magnitude). Within each pair, 440 the two cues were associated to a zero and a non-zero outcome with reciprocal probabilities (0.75/0.25 and 0.25/0.75). On 441 each trial, one pair was randomly presented on the left and the right side of a central fixation cross. Pairs or cues were 442 presented in a pseudo-randomized and unpredictable manner to the subject (intermixed design). The side in which a given 443 cue was presented was also pseudo-randomized, such that a given cue was presented an equal number of times in the left 444 and the right of the central cue. Subjects were required to select between the two cues by pressing one of the corresponding 445 two buttons, with their left or right thumb, to select the leftmost or the rightmost cue, respectively, within a 3000ms time 446 window. After the choice window, a red pointer appeared below the selected cue for 500ms. At the end of the trial, the cues 447 disappeared and the selected one was replaced by the outcome ("+1.0€","+0.1€", "0.0€", "-0.1€" or "-1.0€") for 3000ms. In 448 Experiment 2, in the complete information contexts (50% of the trials), the outcome corresponding to the unchosen option 449 (counterfactual) was displayed. A novel trial started after a fixation screen (1000ms, jittered between 500-1500ms). After the 450 two learning sessions, subjects performed a transfer test. This transfer test involved only the 8 cues (2*4 pairs) of the last 451 session, which were presented in all possible binary combinations (28, not including pairs formed by the same cue) (see also 452 18 ). Each pair of cues was presented 4 times, leading to a total of 112 trials. Instructions for the transfer test were provided 453 orally after the end of the last learning session. Subjects were explained that they would be presented with pairs of cues 454 taken from the last session, and that all pairs would not have been necessarily displayed together before. On each trial, they 455
had to indicate which of the cues was the one with the highest value by pressing on the buttons as in the learning task. 456
Subjects were also explained that there was no money at stake, but encouraged to respond as they would have if it were the 457 case. In order to prevent explicit memorizing strategies, subjects were not informed that they would have to perform a 458 transfer test until the end of the second (last) learning sessions. Timing of the transfer test differed from that of the learning 459 sessions in that the choice was self-paced and in the absence of outcome phase. During the transfer test, the outcome was 460 not provided in order not to modify the option values learned during the learning sessions. Between the leaning sessions and in fixed pairs (choice contexts); 2) how many choice contexts they believed were simultaneously present in a learning 464 session. The experimenter recorded the responses, but provided no feedback about their correctness in order to not affect 465 subjects' performance in the transfer test. 466 467
Model-free analyses 468
For the two experiments, we were interested in three different variables reflecting subjects' learning: (1) correct choice rate 469 (i.e. choices directed toward highest expected reward or the lowest expected loss) during the learning task of the experiment. 470
Statistical effects were assessed using multiple-way repeated measures ANOVAs with feedback valence, feedback 471 magnitude, and feedback information (in Experiment 2 only) as within-subject factors; (2) correct choice rate during the 472 transfer test, i.e., choosing the option with the highest absolute expected value (each symbol has a positive or negative 473 absolute expected value, calculated as Probability(outcome) x Magnitude(outcome)); and (3) choice rate of the transfer test 474 (i.e., the number of times an option is chosen, divided by the number of times the option is presented). The variable 475 represents the value attributed to one option, i.e., the preference of the subjects for each of the symbols. Transfer test choice 476 rates were submitted to multiple-way repeated measures ANOVAs, to assess the effects of option favorableness (being the 477 most advantageous option of the pair), feedback valence and feedback magnitude as within-subject factors. Post-hoc tests 478 were performed using one-sided, one-sample t-tests. As a control analysis, additional post-hoc tests were performed against 479 chance. All statistical analyses were performed using Matlab (www.mathworks.com). 480 481
Model space 482
We analyzed our data with extensions of the Q-learning algorithm 4, 54 . The goal of all models was to find in each choice 483 context (or state) the option that maximizes the expected reward R. where ! is the learning rate for the chosen (c) option and ! the learning rate for the unchosen (u) option, i.e. the 490 counterfactual learning rate. ! and ! are prediction error terms calculated as follows: 491
! is updated in both partial and complete feedback contexts and ! is updated in the complete feedback context only 494 (Experiment 2, only). 495
496
We modelled subjects' choice behavior using a softmax decision rule representing the probability for a subject to choose one 497 option a over the other option b:
where β is the temperature parameter. High temperatures cause the action to be all (nearly) equi-probable. Low 500 temperatures cause a greater difference in selection probability for actions that differ in their value estimates 4 . 501 
Model fitting, comparison and simulation 554
Specifically for the learning sessions, transfer test, and both, we optimized model parameters, the temperature , the factual 555 learning rate ! , the counterfactual learning rate ! (in Experience 2 only) and the weight (in the HYBRID model only), by 556 minimizing the negative log likelihood !"# using Matlab's fmincon function, initialized at starting points of 1 for the 557 temperature and 0.5 for the learning rates and the weight. As a quality check we replicated this analysis using multiple 558 starting points and this did not change the results (S Table 4 ). We computed at the individual level the Bayesian Information 559 Criterion (BIC) using, for each model, its number of free parameters ! (note that the Experiment 2 has an additional 560 parameter ! ) and the number of trials (note that this number of trials varies with the optimization procedure: 561 learning sessions only, 160, transfer test only, 112, or both, 272): 562 ( 11 ) 563 = 2 * !"# + log * !
564
Model estimates of choice probability were generated trial-by-trial using the optimal individual parameters. We made 565 comparisons between predicted and actual choices with a one-sample t-test and tested models' performances out of the 566 sample by assessing their ability to account for the transfer test choices. On the basis of model-estimate choice probability, models. Finally, we submitted the model-estimate transfer-test choice probability to the same statistical analyses as the 569 actual choices (ANOVA and post-hoc t-test; within-simulated data comparison) and we compared modeled choices to the 570 actual data. In particular, we analyzed actual and simulated correct choice rates (i.e., the proportions of choices directed 571 toward the most advantageous stimulus) and compared transfer-test choices for each symbol with a sampled t-test between 572 the behavioral choices and the simulated choices. 573 574 575 576
